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United States v. Olin Corporation:1 How a
Polluter Got Off Clean
MARY FRANCES PALISANO*

[S]ociety should not bear the costs of protecting the public
from hazards produced in the past by a generator, transporter, consumer, or dumpsite owner or operator who has
profited or otherwise benefited from commerce involving
those substances and now wishes to be insulated from any
continuing responsibility for the present hazards to society
2
that have been created.
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Introduction

Until May 20, 1996, no court in the United States that
directly addressed the issue of retroactivity had ever rejected
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act's (CERCLA)3 retroactive 4 application. 5 Additionally, no court had held that CERCLA's reach was beyond Congress' Commerce Clause authority. 6 However, in
United States v. Olin Corp. (Olin), the Southern District of
Alabama ignored fourteen years of precedent and refused to
apply CERCLA retroactively.7 Moreover, the court held
3. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA) of 1980 §§ 101-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
CERCLA was amended by Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
(SARA) of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). Section 6301 of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat.
1388-314 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a)) reauthorizes CERCLA until
Sept. 30, 1994, and grants $5.1 billion of funding.
4. A retroactive law "create[s] new obligations, impose[s] a new duty, or
attach[es] a new disability in respect to the transactions or considerations already past." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1317 (6th ed. 1990).
5. See Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1507.
6. See United States v. NL Indus., Inc., 936 F. Supp. 545 (S.D. Ill. 1996).
7. See Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1507 n.25 (citing United States v. Monsanto
Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Northeastern Pharm. &
Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986); HRW Sys. v. Washington Gas, 823 F.
Supp. 318 (D. Md. 1993); City of Phila. v. Stepan Chem., 748 F. Supp. 283 (E.D.
Pa. 1990); Kelley v. Sovent Co., 714 F. Supp. 1439 (W.D. Mich. 1989); O'Neil v.
Picillo, 682 F. Supp. 706 (D.R.I. 1988); United States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics, 680 F. Supp. 546 (W.D.N.Y. 1988); United States v. Dickerson, 640 F.
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CERCLA to be unconstitutional8 because its application exceeds Congress' Commerce Clause 9 authority in regulating
the disposal' of hazardous substances."
Adopted in 1980,12 CERCLA authorizes the federal government to "provide for liability, compensation, cleanup, and
emergency response for hazardous substances released into
the environment and the cleanup of inactive hazardous waste
Supp. 448 (D. Md. 1986); United States v. Ottati & Gross, Inc., 630 F. Supp.
1361 (D.N.H. 1985); Town of Boonton v. Drew Chem., 621 F. Supp. 663 (D.N.J.
1985); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo.
1985); United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823
(W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 589 F. Supp. 59
(W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Colo.
1985); Jones v. Inmont, 584 F. Supp. 1425 (S.D. Ohio 1984); United States v.
South Carolina Recycling & Disposal Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984 (D.S.C. 1984);
United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103 (D.N.J. 1983); State of Ohio ex rel.
Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ohio 1983); United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 556 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Ill. 1982); United States v. Reilly Tar
& Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982); United States v. Wade, 546
F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (offsite generators of wastes disposed of before
CERCLA's enactment held liable under section 107 of CERCLA); United States
v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. Ill. 1984)).
8. See id. at 1533. See Appellant's Brief at 1, United States v. Olin Corp.,
927 F. Supp. 1502 (S.D. Ala. 1996) (No. 96-6645) thereinafter Brief].
9. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
10. See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976 §§ 10011102, 1004(3), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k, 6903(3) (1976 & Supp. IV 1994). RCRA
defines the term "disposal" as the
discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing
of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water
so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or any constituent
thereof may enter the environment or be emitted into the air or
discharged into any waters, including ground waters.
Id. § 1004(3), 42 U.S.C. § 6903.
11. Section 101(14) of CERCLA defines hazardous substances broadly by
encompassing those substances that are designated as hazardous or toxic under
other environmental statutes, including "hazardous substances" defined under
the Clean Water Act (CWA) of 1972 § 311(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(14) (1994),
"toxic pollutants" under section 307(a) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C § 1317(a), "hazardous air pollutants" listed in the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAA) of 1990
§ 112(6), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b) (1994), and "hazardous wastes" listed under section 1004(5) of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5). See CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(14). Additionally, substances are listed by the EPA in 40 C.F.R. pt.
302.4 (1996).
12. See CERCLA §§ 101-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 960-75.
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disposal sites." 13 The fundamental goal of CERCLA is to hold
those parties who improperly dispose of hazardous substances liable for subsequent cleanup costs. 14 Although CERCLA was intended to attain this goal, it was passed as a "last
minute compromise,"1 5 and is often criticized for its statutory
6
framework and language.'
Since its inception, CERCLA has remained controversial
because it does not explicitly mention the term "retroactivity"
in its text.17 This holds true despite the fact that
courts have determined unanimously that CERCLA imposes retrospective liability-that is, even where the underlying conduct occurred prior to CERCLA's passage.
Additionally, the courts have had little trouble in upholding the constitutionality of this retrospectivity, finding that
it passes the rationality test established by the Supreme
i8
Court.

Over 35,000 sites are known to be contaminated by past disposal actions. 19 Those sites deemed by the United States En13. Nevada ex rel. Dep't of Transp. v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 691, 697
(D. Nev. 1996).
14. See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1553 (11th Cir.
1990).
15. See Brief, supra note 8, at 12.

16. See

WILLIAM

H.

RODGERS, JR.,

14

ENVIRONMENTAL

LAW: HAZARDOUS

WASTE AND SUBSTANCES at 514-15 (1988).
Vagueness, contradiction, and dissembling are familiar features of
environmental statutes, but CERCLA is secure in its reputation as
the worst drafted of the lot. In CERCLA judicial opinions, denunciations of the text and origin have reached the level of compulsory
ritual, more frequent even than contaminations of the polluted
landscapes that gave rise to the law in the first place.
Id.
17. See, e.g., id.

18.

JEFFREY

G.

MILLER & CRAIG

N.

JOHNSTON, THE LAW OF HAZARDOUS

WASTE DISPOSAL AND REMEDIATION 58 (1996) [hereinafter MILLER]. Jeffrey G.
Miller is a Professor of Law at Pace University School of Law.
19. See id. at 9. A 1996 report prepared by the Environmental Law Institute for the United States Environmental Protection Agency identified approximately 54,000 contaminated sites in the United States, including sites
contaminated after 1980. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
SUPERFUND:
STATE VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS PROVIDE ALTERNATIVES TO ENCOURAGE CLEANUPS, GAO/RCED-97-66 20 (1997) (citing ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
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vironmental Protection Agency (EPA) 20 to "pose [a] sufficient
danger to health or the environment" are placed on the National Priority List (NPL).2 1 The NPL site cleanups average
over $26 million in remediation costs and six to ten years to
22
complete.
Prior to the Olin decision, if a party improperly disposed
of a hazardous substance on a site before 1980, the year of
CERCLA's enactment, the EPA would first use government
money to clean up the site, and then seek reimbursement
from the responsible party. 2 3 However, under the Olin rationale, CERCLA only applies prospectively; thus, that party
would not be held liable. 24 As a result, the financial burden of
INSTITUTE,

AN ANALYSIS OF STATE SUPERFUND PROGRAMS:

50-STATE STUDY

(1995)).
20. The EPA is an administrative agency that is part of the executive
branch. See Miller, supra note 18, at 85. It was created by an executive order
that consolidated environmental responsibility previously held by cabinet level
departments. See id. The EPA is the primary environmental regulator of the
federal government, and is responsible for implementing environmental statutes, including RCRA and CERCLA. See id. at 9.
21. The NPL is a part of CERCLA's response procedures. CERCLA requires the EPA to develop criteria based on risks to public health, welfare, or
the environment. Based on the criteria, EPA ranks the various sites for listing
on the NPL. See CERCLA § 105(a)(8)(A)-(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(A)-(B)
(1988 & Supp. V 1993). SARA was revised in 1990. See Hazard Ranking System, 55 Fed. Reg. 51,532 (1990) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 App. A (1996)).
The NPL is part of the National Contingency Plan (NCP) and must be updated
annually. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 (1996). The NCP was last amended in 1994.
See National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 59
Fed. Reg. 47, 384 (1994) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(c)(4) (1996)).
22. See MILLER, supra note 18, at 9.

23. Section 122(a) of CERCLA provides:
The President, in his discretion, may enter into an agreement with
any person (including the owner or operator of the facility from
which a release or substantial threat of release emanates, or any
other potentially responsible person), to perform any response action (including any action described in section 9604(b) of this title)
if the President determines that such action will be done properly
by such person. Whenever practicable and in the public interest, as
determined by the President, the President shall act to facilitate
agreements under this section that are in the public interest and
consistent with the National Contingency Plan in order to expedite
effective remedial actions and minimize litigation.
CERCLA § 122(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a).
24. See Olin, 927 F. Supp. 1502 (S.D. Ala. 1996).
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a site's cleanup costs would shift to taxpayers and the responsible party would profit from its improper disposal.
With this in mind, the Olin decision had the potential to
adversely affect the future of all Americans and the environment, including the deterioration of health and welfare, environmental degradation, and unwarranted tax increases. This
is evident from the fact that defendants in other jurisdictions
attempted to use the "Olin argument" in their efforts to avoid
paying for their pre-CERCLA polluting a mere six months af25
ter the Olin decision.
Congress has legislated that all Americans "should enjoy
a healthy environment and that each person has a responsibility to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of
our environment." 2 6 However, the Olin opinion controverts
this premise by providing a loophole for those parties who unlawfully disposed of hazardous substances and benefited from
that disposal at the expense of the American people and the
environment.
This Case Note will examine whether the decision in
Olin had any merit. Part II provides background information
on CERCLA's enactment, including its legislative history and
an overview of case law prior to the Olin decision. Part III
discusses the facts and the procedural history of Olin. Part
IV analyzes the court's reasoning regarding CERCLA's retroactivity and unconstitutionality by focusing on the language
of the statute and case law. Part V discusses the recent appeal and reversal of the Olin decision. Part VI concludes, as
shown in the appeal, that the Olin court was erroneous in
holding that CERCLA is merely prospective and unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.
25. See, e.g., Nova Chem., Inc. v. GAF Corp., 945 F. Supp. 1098 (E.D. Tenn.
1996); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., Nos. 87-CV-920, 91-CV-1132,
1996 WL 637559 (N.D.N.Y. 1996); United States v. NL Indus., Inc., 936 F. Supp
545 (S.D. Ill. 1996); Gould Inc. v. A & M Battery & Tire Serv., 933 F. Supp. 431
(M.D. Pa. 1996); Ninth Ave. Remedial Group v. Fiberbond Corp., 946 F. Supp.
651 (N.D. Ind. 1996).
26. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 §§ 101-209,101(c),
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d, 4331(c) (1994). See also Alcan Aluminum Corp., 1996
WL 637559.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss1/12

6

1997]
II.
A.

U.S. v. OLIN CORP.

407

Background

The Evolution and Reauthorization of CERCLA

Stringent federal environmental regulations began with
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 197027 and the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972.28 However, Congress soon recognized that "no federal statute regulated the disposal of environmental pollutants, including
solid wastes and hazardous wastes, on land."29 By the mid1970s, the amount of discarded hazardous waste 30 had accumulated to an exorbitant amount; approximately four billion
31
tons of waste had been produced yearly.
In response, Congress enacted a national policy mandating that "hazardous waste .. be treated, 3 2 stored, 33 and disposed 34 of so as to minimize the present and future threat to
27. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7401-7671a (1994)).
28. 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1376 (1994).
29. United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1070 (D. Colo. 1985).
30. "Hazardous waste" encompasses
a solid waste, or combination of solid wastes, which because of its
quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may-(A) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase
in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating
reversible, illness; or (B) pose a substantial present or potential
hazard to human health or the environment when improperly
treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise managed.
RCRA § 1004(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1976 & Supp. IV 1994).
31. See MILLER, supra note 18, at 44.
32. RCRA states:
[Wihen used in connection with hazardous waste, [treatment]
means any method, technique, or process, including neutralization,
designed to change the physical, chemical, or biological character or
composition of any hazardous waste so as to neutralize such waste
or so as to render such waste nonhazardous, safer for transport,
amenable for recovery, amenable for storage, or reduced in volume.
RCRA § 1004(34), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(34).
33. "[Wlhen used in connection with hazardous waste, [storage] means the
containment of hazardous waste, either on a temporary basis or for a period of
years, in such a manner as not to constitute disposal of such hazardous waste."
Id. § 1004(33), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(33).
34. CERCLA adapted the RCRA definition of disposal.
See R. CRAIG ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL HANDBOOK 406 (Thomas
F.P. Sullivan ed., 13th ed. 1996). See also supra note 10.
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human health and the environment." 35 To implement this
policy, Congress created the Resource Conversation and Recovery Act (RCRA), which provides regulations establishing
requirements for "record keeping practices, labeling practices, use of appropriate containers, use of a manifest system, 36 and the design, construction, operation and
maintenance of facilities." 3 7 RCRA was "designed as a 'cradle
to grave' regulation that imposed requirements on the generator, transporter, and owner and operator of the treatment
38
and disposal facilities for hazardous waste."
35. In its report on RCRA, the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce stated:
The Committee believes that the approach taken by this legislation
eliminates the last remaining loophole in environmental law, that
of unregulated land disposal of discarded materials and hazardous
wastes. Further, the Committee believes that this legislation is
necessary if other environmental laws are to be both cost and environmentally effective. At present the federal government is spending billions of dollars to remove pollutants from the air and water,
only to dispose of such pollutants on the land in an environmentally
unsound manner. The existing methods of land disposal often result in air pollution, subsurface leachate and surface run-off, which
affect air and water quality. This legislation will eliminate this
problem and permit the environmental laws to function in a coordinated and effective way.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1491, at 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6241-42
(1976).
36. A "manifest system" means "the form used for identifying the quantity,
composition, and the origin, routing, and destination of hazardous waste during
its transportation from the point of generation to the point of disposal, treatment, or storage." RCRA § 1004(12), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(12).
37. United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1070 (D. Colo. 1985).
RCRA provides for the promulgation of regulations by the Environmental Protection Agency applicable to generators of hazardous
waste, transporters of hazardous waste, and owners and operators
of hazardous waste treatment, storage and disposal facilities. The
regulations establish requirements respecting, among other things,
record keeping practices, labeling practices, use of appropriate containers, use of a manifest system, and the design, construction, operation and maintenance of facilities (42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-34; 40
C.F.R. Parts 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267 and 270).
Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. at 1070.
38. ANDERSON, supra note 35, at 44. For the "standards applicable to owners and operators of hazardous waste treatment, storage and disposal facilities," see RCRA § 3004, 42 U.S.C. § 6924.
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However, Congress soon realized that RCRA was ineffective in remedying environmental degradation that occurred
from past disposal of hazardous substances. 39 Shortly after
RCRA's enactment, it was discovered that hazardous wastes
disposed of prior to 1976, were not dispersing in safe concentrations. 40 This problem became more complex when a site
was found to be either inactive or abandoned. 4 1 For example,
two disposal sites in particular focused the attention of the
American public on the issue of its health and environment:
"Love Canal" 42 in Niagara Falls, New York, and "Valley of
the Drums" 43 in Shepardsville, Kentucky. 44 Consequently,
Congress discovered

. . .

that its work was not complete.

Land pollution presented a problem not encountered with
air and water pollution. Air and navigable waters are,
generally speaking, self-cleansing through time. Carbon
monoxide in air and phosphates in water can thus be
abated by limiting or eliminating present sources of pollution. But hazardous wastes deposited on land do not simply disperse into harmless concentrations. They can
percolate through the soil and infiltrate ground water; and
39. See MILLER, supra note 18, at 9.
40. See Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. at 1070.
41. ANDERSON, supra note 35, at 407.
42. See Snyder v. Hooker Chem. & Plastic Corp., 429 N.Y.S.2d 153 (Sup. Ct.
1980). "In September, 1979, plaintiffs commenced th[is] ...action in the form
of a class action, alleging that they became 'sick, sore, lame, and disabled' due
to exposure to hazardous waste while residents of the 'Love Canal Site.'" Id. at
154. See also S. REP. No. 96-848, pt. I, at 8-10 (1980), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 2, at Vol. II, 480-81. This site received national attention,
including then President Jimmy Carter declaring the Love Canal Site a disaster area, as well as national coverage by the press. See, e.g., Kathy Trost, Love
Canal: I've Had More Sleepless Nights Than I Can Count: Despite Warning
Signs, Some Residents Stay On, WASH. POST, June 23, 1980, at Al; Robert D.
McFadden, Love Canal: A Look Back, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 30, 1984, at B6; Chemical Firm Held Liable for Cleanup of Love Canal, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1988, at 2.
43. See S. REP. No. 96-848, at 4 (1980), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 2, at Vol. II, 478. Like Love Canal, discussed supra note 43, Valley
of the Drums also received national press coverage. See, e.g., Bill Richards,

U.S. to Sue Hazardous Waste Dumping, Companies Face Action 100 Sites,
WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1979, at A2; David F. Salisbury, Superfund Set to Start
Cleaning Up Abandoned Hazardous Waste Sites, CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, Dec.
8, 1980, at 7.
44. See MILLER, supra note 18, at 52.
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they can persist over long periods of time. Congress, faced
with sites such as Love Canal, clearly understood that the
mere regulation of current land disposal would not adethe public health and welfare or the
quately protect
45
environment.
CERCLA, enacted in 1980, "was designed to respond to
situations involving the past disposal of hazardous sub47
stances." 46 Accordingly, Congress established Superfund,
which comprised $1.6 billion in order to facilitate the EPA's
remediation of hazardous substances." Moreover, CERCLA
required the EPA to create a National Contingency Plan
(NCP)4 9 to be read in conjunction with CERCLA section
104(a)(1), which establishes the framework for remedial action and expenditure of Superfund money. 50
CERCLA "compliments [RCRA] which regulates an ongoing hazardous waste handling and disposal." 5 1 The goal of
CERCLA is to "cleanup leaking, inactive or abandoned sites
and provide emergency response to spills." 5 2 In short,
CERCLA is not a traditional 'command and control' regulatory program; its focus is not on establishing rules governing future behavior. CERCLA authorizes remediation
of contamination and imposes liability for past actions associated with it, even if those actions were consistent with
all then-existing laws and standards of care. That liability
53
can be enormous.
45. Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. at 1070-71.
46. ANDERSON, supra note 35, at 225.
47. One of the most important aspects of CERCLA, used by EPA to clean up

hazardous waste sites, is Superfmnd. Superfind is made up of taxes imposed on
industrial companies, industry, and general tax revenue. See id. at 226.
48. See MILLER, supra note 18, at 56.
49. The NCP creates a framework for analyzing the procedural and substantive elements of the CERCLA cleanup process. See id. at 56-57. The NCP
authorizes the expenditure of Superfund money at sites on the NPL; however,
CERCLA activities can occur at sites not on the NPL. See id. at 57.
50. See id. at 56. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 (1996) (the EPA's guidance for CERCIA § 104(a)(1), 44 U.S.C § 9604(a)(1)).
51. ANDERSON, supra note 35, at 225.
52. JOHN C. CRUDEN, ALI-ABA CONTINUING EDUCATION, ENVIRONMENTAL
LITIGATION 519 (1996).
53. MILLER, supra note 18, at 52.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss1/12

10

1997]

U.S. v. OLIN CORP.

At the time of CERCLA's enactment, Congress was not
aware of the powerful mechanism it had created. 54 In fact,
CERCLA's liability scheme has an impact on "virtually every
industrial real estate transaction" in the Nation. 55 For liability to attach, the EPA merely has to show a release 5 6 or a
threatened release of a hazardous substance from the site,
caused by a potentially responsible party (PRP).5 7 Moreover,
a PRP is defined broadly by the EPA58 and will be held
strictly liable 59 for problems caused by its disposal activities. 60 Under CERCLA, those owners, generators, and transporters found responsible are liable for
54. See id. at 55.
55. See id.
56. The term "release" includes:
any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into
the environment (including the abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant) ....
CERCLA § 101(22), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1988 & Supp. V 1996).
57. A "PRP" is defined as
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous
substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous
substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for
transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned
or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any
facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or
entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person ....
CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
58. See MILLER, supra note 18, at 57.
59. Under CERCLA, there is little reference to the scope of the term "liability"; however, the legislative history clarifies Congress's intention to hold the
statute strictly liable without regard to fault or culpability. See S. REP. No. 96848 (1980), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at Vol. II, 492-93.
CERCLA provides for broad liability, including strict, joint, and several and
retroactive liability. CERCLA § 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f). See, e.g., United
States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (D. Ohio 1983) (discussing the
scope of CERCLA liability).
60. See Brief, supra note 8, at 3. The only defenses against liability in CERCLA are narrowly drawn and include: acts of God, acts of war, and acts or
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(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the
United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe
not inconsistent with the national contingency plan; (B)
any other necessary costs of response incurred by any
other person consistent with the national contingency
plan; (C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of
natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction or loss resulting from such a
release; and (D) the costs of any health effects study car61
ried out under section 9604(I) of this title.
Although CERCLA was more powerful than anticipated,
Congress reauthorized and amended CERCLA through the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) in
1986.62 SARA "reflect[s] [an] overwhelming [c]ongressional
satisfaction with CERCLA's original scope and liability
scheme, as interpreted by the courts in the intervening
years." 63 SARA did not change the original structure of CERCLA, but introduced new concepts that acknowledged congressional dissatisfaction with the "EPA's administration of
CERCLA, particularly [its] slow pace of remediation." 6 4 In
short, SARA provided the EPA with guidance in exercising its
authority. 65 For example, Congress developed "a schedule to
assess, study and remediate contaminated sites."6 6 Congress
also increased Superfund to $8.5 billion dollars and, in 1990,
added another $5.1 billion, providing the EPA with more
money to expedite Superfund cleanups. 6 7
omissions of a third party not in contractual privity with the party asserting the
defense. CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607. SARA created a third party defense called the "innocent purchaser" defense. See id. § 101(35), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(35).
61. See id. § 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4).
62. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1615 (1986). The statute in total is still
referred to as CERCLA, despite the 1986 SARA amendments. See ANDERSON,
supra note 35, at 472.
63. MILLER, supra note 18, at 55.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 55-56.
66. Id. at 56.
67. See id.
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Case Law
1.

Retroactivity

Prior to the Olin decision, courts throughout the United
States consistently held that CERCLA applied retroactively. 68 This occurred even though CERCLA's statutory lan69
guage does not explicitly mention the term retroactivity.

a. State of Ohio ex rel Brown v. Georgeoff
70
(Georgeoff)
In 1983, the Georgeoff court held that the congressional
intent of CERCLA was sufficient evidence to compel a retroactive application of CERCLA. 71 In analyzing CERCLA, the
court applied the Supreme Court's ruling in Greene v. United
States,72 which stated that
the first rule of construction is that legislation must be considered as addressed to the future, not to the past... [and]
a retroactive operation will not be given to a statute which
interferes with antecedent rights . . . unless such be 'the
unequivocal and inflexible import of the terms, and mani73
fest intention of the legislature.'
Using a presumption against retroactivity, the Georgeoff
court examined the statutory language, noting that CERCLA's statutory language does not explicitly indicate an in74
tent to apply CERCLA retroactively.
The state presented a twofold argument to persuade the
75
court that Congress did, in fact, intend a retroactive effect.
The state's chief argument 76 was made pursuant to section
68. See supra note 7. The Supreme Court has not directly addressed this
subject. Search of WESTLAW, SCT Library (Nov. 1, 1996).
69. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
70. 562 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
71. Id. at 1314.
72. See id. at 1308.
73. Id. at 1306 (quoting Union Pacific R. Co. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co.,
231 U.S. 190, 199 (1913)).
74. See id. at 1308.
75. See id. at 1311-12.
76. There are three arguments not addressed by the court that support the
theory that CERCLA is retroactive. First, CERCLA commonly refers to "inac-
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107(a), particularly subsection (4), which provides provisions
for civil liability. 77 The state demonstrated its argument by
using the date of the enactment of CERCLA, 1980, as a point
of reference. 78 The state focused its argument on subsection
(a)(4), which extends liability to "any person who accepts or
accepted any hazardous substances for transport," 79 arguing
that the past tense verb "accepted" indicates liability for conduct following CERCLA's enactment.8 0 However, the court
was not convinced that the terms in the statutory provisions
provided the "imperative character" required to defeat a presumption against retroactivity.8 '
The court stated that prior to CERCLA's enactment, subsection (a)(4) read "any person who accepts any hazardous
substances for transport."8 2 When the change "or accepted"
was eventually incorporated in the text, the court found that
because it was not mentioned in the legislative history, Contive" waste disposal sites, indicating Congress's intent to center on past, rather
than future, acts. See id. at 1310. Additionally, CERCLA permits reimbursements from the Superfund for response costs for conduct pre-CERCLA, implying that some provisions of CERCLA are retroactive. See id. Lastly, section
9607(f) regarding recovery for injuries to natural resources occurring pre-CERCLA implies that a comparable prohibition does not apply to other response
costs. See id. The court noted that this provision "only serves to support Ohio's
attempt to override the presumption." See id. See also CERLCA § 101, 42
U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(iii) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) ("in the case of any abandoned
facility . . . "); H. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 22 (1980), re-

printed in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6119, 6125 ("It is the intent of the Committee
... [to] establish a comprehensive response and financing mechanism to abate
and control the vast problems associated with abandoned and inactive hazardous waste disposal sites").
"BFI, in response, argues that these provisions only authorize state action
to clean up existing dump sites. They do not authorize suits against individuals
responsible for creating the hazard, nor does such a reading necessarily have to
follow from CERCLA." Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. at 1310 n.14. The court explained that it only consider these statutory terms as indicia of a congressional
intent to apply CERCLA retroactively. See id. at 1311-12.
77. See CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
78. See Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. at 1310.
79. Id. at 1309-10.
80. See id. at 1310.
81. See id. at 1311. However, the court did conclude that the provisions
argued provided some evidence of congressional intent. See id. at 1311-12.
82. Id. at 1310 n.10 (citing S. REP. No. 96-848 (1980)).
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83
gress did not intend to attach significance to the addition.
The court determined that under the state's theory, a past
tense verb would suggest application to pre-enactment acts,
whereas a present or future tense verb would only apply to
post-enactment acts.8 4 The court demonstrated that if this
were true, "this provision would only apply to generators who
arranged for disposal before the enactment of CERCLA, and
not those who arrange for disposal after the enactment of
CERCLA. '8 5 Accordingly, the court held that this "construction produces the anomalous result of providing for a retroacstatute, a result
tive, but not a prospective, application of the
86
intended."
have
not
could
Congress
which

83. See id. (citing 126 CONG. REC. S14, 719 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1980)).
At oral argument, Ohio and Justice also argued that the words 'selected by such person' in § 9607(a)(4) also indicate a congressional
intent to apply CERCLA retroactively. Upon review, this Court
finds that argument unpersuasive. The word 'selected' applies
equally to future, as well as past, applications of the statute. In
fact, no other form of the verb 'select' would make sense in this
position.
Id. at 1310 n.11.
84. See id. at 1310.
85. Id.
86. Id. The court suggested that a more logical interpretation of the language is
to read the phrase 'accepts or accepted' from the perspective of the
time of a release or threatened release, a view supported by the
language of § 9607. Under § 9607, two events must take place
before any liability accrues. The individual must fall within one of
the categories specified by subsections 1-4 of § 9607(a) and a release
or threatened release must occur. It therefore makes sense to interpret the former event, the act by the individual, in the context of
the latter event, the release or threatened release. Construing the
phrase 'accepts or accepted' from the time of a release, the word
accepted will apply to all impositions of liability under CERCLA;
the act of accepting the hazardous wastes will have always taken
place before the occurrence of a release which causes the incurrence
of response costs. Transporters who acted after the enactment of
CERCLA will be held liable as having 'accepted' hazardous wastes.
It will be unnecessary to construe the word 'accepted' to apply to
pre-enactment conduct to give it effect. 'Accepted' may apply to preenactment conduct, but the statute does not require such an
application.
Id. at 1310 n.12.
This construction of § 9607(a)(4) makes the word 'accepts' virtually
meaningless. At most, 'accepts' will apply to transporters who ac-
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Next, the state argued that the congressional debates
demonstrated an unequivocal intent by Congress to make the
industry pay for the cleanup costs. 8 7 In response, the defendant, Georgeoff, argued that Congress only intended industry
to pay for cleanups through the special tax industry is required to pay to finance the Superfund. 8 In its analysis, the
court noted that when CERCLA was enacted, the total
amount in the Superfund was merely $1.6 billion.8 9 At that
time, the average cost of a cleanup exceeded $3 million per
site. 90 Accordingly, the court held that this amount obviously
was not intended to clean up the thousands of hazardous
sites without any responsible parties supplementing a majority of the cleanup costs911 The court reasoned that the insufficient funds in the Superfund indicated that "Congress did not
intend for the fund to be depleted, rather that the fund would
be maintained as a revolving fund for advancing the costs of
92
these clean up operations while litigation progressed."
Thus, the court concluded that the legislative history demonstrated a clear congressional intent to have industry pay for
93
cleanups, including retroactive liability.
b.

United States v. Shell Oil Co. (Shell Oil)94

Two years later, the Shell Oil court determined that
CERCLA did, in fact, authorize the recovery of government
pre-enactment response costs from the industry. 9 5 To determine if Congress overrode the presumption against retroaccept hazardous substances for transport to facilities from which a
release is presently occurring.
Id.
87. See id. at 1311.
88. See id. at 1312.
89. See id. at 1312-13.
90. See id. at 1313. When CERCLA was enacted, the highest cost estimated for cleanup of all known contaminated sites was approximately $44 billion. See 126 CONG. REC. H9177 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1980) (remarks of Rep.
Railsback).
91. See Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. at 1312.
92. Id. at 1313.
93. See id.
94. 605 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Colo. 1985).
95. Id. at 1079.
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tivity, the court first examined the statutory language in
CERCLA's liability section. 9 6 Ultimately, the court determined that there was no explicit statement of congressional
intent. 9 7 As previous courts have found, this court failed to
ascertain Congress' intent regarding retroactivity from the
98
verb tenses in section 107(a).
The court next focused on other statutory provisions of
CERCLA and its legislative history, assessing the general
purpose and overall scheme of CERCLA. 9 9 In its analysis,
the court examined CERCLA in an historical context, specifically in light of its place among prior environmental statutes. 10 0 Since no pre-CERCLA law addressed environmental
problems resulting from hazardous waste disposed of in the
past, the court found that CERCLA was enacted by Congress
to solve the deficiencies that left regulatory gaps with inactive hazardous waste disposal sites. 10'
96. See id. at 1069. CERCLA's liability provision, section 107(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a), is discussed supra Part II.A.
97. See Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. at 1069.
98. See Georgeoff, 502 F. Supp. at 1309-10. In Georgeoff the court analyzed
the verb tenses in section 107(a) to determine whether Congress intended responsible parties to be liable for their acts pre-CERCLA. See id. The court
noted that the "awkwardness of this phrase may be explained by the context of
CERCLA's passage. CERCLA was rushed through a lame duck session of Congress, and therefore, might not have received adequate drafting." Id. at 1310
n.12.
99. See Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. at 1069-70.
100. See id. at 1070. Congress, in 1976, enacted RCRA, Pub. L. No. 94-580,
90 Stat. 2795 (1976), subsequently codified as an amendment to the Solid Waste
Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1976 & Supp. IV 1994). See Shell Oil,
605 F. Supp. at 1070.
101. See Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. at 1070. The background and need for CERCLA are explained in House Report 1016 as follows:
Over the past two decades, the Congress has enacted strong environmental legislation in recognition of the danger to human health
and the environment posed by a host of environmental pollutants.
This field of environmental legislation has expanded to address
newly discovered sources of such danger as the frontiers of medical
and scientific knowledge have been broadened. After having previously focused on air and water pollutants, the Congress, in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, provided a
prospective cradle-to-grave regulatory regime governing the movement of hazardous waste in our society. Since enactment of that
law, a major new source of environmental concern has surfaced:
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Thereafter, the two issues the Shell Oil court addressed
were: (1) whether, under CERCLA, responsible parties are
liable for acts committed prior to CERCLA's enactment; and
(2) whether responsible parties should pay for government
costs in addressing the pre-enactment conduct.1 0 2 Agreeing
with prior courts' analyses, this court dismissed the first is3
sue as settled law. 10
the tragic consequences of improperly, negligently, and recklessly
[sic] hazardous waste disposal practices known as the 'inactive hazardous waste site problem.' The unfortunate human health and environmental consequence of these practices has received national
attention amidst growing public and congressional concern over the
magnitude of the problem and the appropriate course of response
that should be pursued. Existing law is clearly inadequate to deal
with this massive problem.
Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. at 1071 (citing H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, 17-18, 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120 (1980)).
The Report went on to detail the inadequacies of existing law. Of
particular significance to this discussion is the following
observation:
'(c) Deficiencies in RCRA have left important regulatory gaps.
(1) The Act is prospective and applies to past sites only to the
extent that they are posing an imminent hazard. Even there[,] the
Act is of no help if a financially responsible owner of the site cannot
be located.'
Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, at 22, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6125).
After recounting a number of environmental disasters, including
Love Canal, the [Senate] report concluded
'There is limited authority to solve these problems. Regulations promulgated in May under subtitle C of the Solid Waste Disposal Act [RCRA], which impose tough new standards for operating
toxic waste disposal facilities, are expected to greatly upgrade the
Nation's active toxic waste disposal sites. But the regulations do
not address those situations where an owner is unknown or is unable to pay the cleanup costs, nor do they address the cleanup of
spills, illegal dumping, or releases generally.'
Id. (citing S. REP. No. 96-848, 10-11 (1980)).
102. Id.
103. See id. at 1072 (citing United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984 (D.S.C. 1984); United States v. Conservation
Chem. Co., 589 F. Supp. 59 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v. Northeastern
Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. A & F
Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. Ill. 1984); United States v. Price, 577 F.
Supp. 1103 (D.N.J. 1983); Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ohio 1983);
United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 556 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Ill. 1982);
United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982);
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As to the second issue, the court concluded that there
was congressional intent to hold responsible parties liable for
acts prior to CERCLA's enactment because Congress formerly imposed cleanup costs on industry, 10 4 rather than taxpayers.10 5 The court commented on several controversial
aspects of CERCLA's legislative history, 10 6 including a last
minute amendment by the Senate to remove the provision
imposing liability for personal injury caused by hazardous
waste disposal. The Senate amendment was struck down by
the House. As a result, House Bill 7020 (H.R. 7020) was
crafted.10 7 Section 3072 of H.R. 7020, as introduced, provided: "The provisions of this subpart and subpart C shall
apply to releases of hazardous waste without regard to
whether or not such releases occurred before or occur on or
after, the date of the enactment of the Hazardous Waste Containment Act of 1980."108 The government argued "that H.R.
7020, as introduced, authorized the recovery of pre-enactment response costs." 0 9 Since this retroactivity provision
was struck from H.R. 7020,110 Shell Oil argued that its dele-

tion weighs heavily against a retroactive application of
CERCLA. 111
However, the court refused to agree with Shell Oil's argument because the language did not become law." 2 The
version enacted by Congress substituted the House language
with that of Senate Bill 1480 (S. 1480).113 Therefore, it is unUnited States v. Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (offsite generators of
wastes disposed of before CERCLA's enactment liable under section 107)).
104. For purposes of this discussion, "industry" encompasses any entity that
is involved in the production, storage, treatment and disposal of hazardous
substances.
105. See Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. at 1073.
106. See id. at 1077. The two significant bills which passed through the
House and Senate were Senate Bill 1480, S. 1480, 96th Cong. (1980), and House
Bill 7020, H.R.7020, 96th Cong. (1980). See id.
107. House Bill 7020 exhibited the House file number because of a requirement that appropriations measures originate in the House. See id. at 1076.
108. H.R. 7020 § 3072.
109. Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. at 1077.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id. See 126 CONG. REC. 31,950 (1980).
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clear whether the House's liability scheme was incorporated
in the final version of the bill or whether the House accepted
114
the Senate's liability language.
This provision, cited by Shell Oil, only addressed the
time when the releases occurred. 11 5 It did not distinguish be16
tween costs incurred pre-enactment and post-enactment.
Yet, Shell Oil argued that S. 1480 subsection 4(n) was struck
from the enacted compromise bill to indicate an intent not to
17
authorize recovery for pre-enactment response costs."
114. See Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. at 1077.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 1077 n.5.
CERCLA's liability provisions originated from the original Senate
Bill, S.1480. S.1480, which contained a liability provision for costs
of removal (§ 4(a)(1)) and for natural resources, property and personal injury damages (§ 4(a)(2)). During discussions of S.1480 in
the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, the issue
retroactive appiication of the bill was addressed.
Transcript of Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works Mark-up
Session of S. 1480, June 26-27, 1980.
117. See Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. at 1076. Senate Bill 1480's liability provision, as introduced, read as follows:
IT] he owner or operator of a vessel or an onshore or offshore facility
from which a hazardous substance is discharged, released, or disposed of in violation of section 3(a) of this Act ... shall be jointly,
severally, and strictly liable for-(1)(A) all costs of removal, containment, or emergency response incurred by the United States
Government or a State and (B) any other costs or expenses incurred
by any person to remove a hazardous substance as the terms 'remove' or 'removal' are defined in section 311(a)(8) of the Clean
Water Act; and (2) all damages for economic loss or loss due to personal injury or loss of natural resources resulting from such a discharge, release, or disposal, including-(A) any injury to,
destruction of, or loss of any real or personal property, including
relocation costs; (B) any loss of use of real or personal property; (C)
any injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including
the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss;
(D) any loss of use of any natural resources, without regard to the
ownership or management of such resources; (E) any loss of income
or profits or impairment of earning capacity resulting from injury to
or destruction of real or personal property or natural resources,
without regard to the ownership of such property or resources; (F)
all out-of-pocket medical expenses, including rehabilitation costs,
due to personal injury; and (G) any direct or indirect loss of tax,
royalty, rental, or net profits share revenue by the Federal Government or any State or political subdivision thereof, for a period of not
to exceed one year.
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However, the time limitations on damages supplemented
by S. 1480 section 4(n) were sustained in the final version of
CERCLA as the limitations on recovery of natural resource
damages. 118 The additional time limitations of section 4(n)
were struck down because the substantive liability provisions
for property and personal injury damages were removed from
the statute. 1 19 Therefore, the scheme of section 4(n) in minimizing recovery for pre-enactment damages, not including re120
sponse costs, was maintained in the final version.
history
Accordingly, the court determined that the legislative
21
of section 4(n) included retroactive effects.'
Next, the court in Shell Oil cited the following passage
from the Senate Report:
Removal and remedial actions to protect public health,
welfare, and the environment should begin without delay
and prior to full implementation of the programs, regulations, plans, and procedures required by this Act. The
many pressing problems which have led to enactment of
legislation should not continue unabated pending such adShell Oil, 605 F. Supp. at 1077 n.5. The liability section introduced to limit
recovery for pre-enactment damages recoverable read as follows:
No person (including the United States, the Fund, or any State)
may recover under the authority of this section, nor may any money
in the Fund be used under Section 6 of this Act for the payment of
any claim, for damages specified under subsection (a)(2)(A), (B), (C),
(D), (G), or (E) (other than for loss resulting from personal injury) of
this section, nor may any money in the Fund be used under section
6(a)(1)(E) or (F) of this Act, where such damages and the release of
a hazardous substance from which such damages resulted have occurred wholly before the enactment of this Act.
In addition, commenting on the provision of § 4(n) (4) that 'the
costs of temporary or permanent relocation of residences ...

shall

be deemed costs of removal and not damages,' Senator Domenici
stated that the purpose of this provision was 'that those kinds of
damages become part of causes of action for costs of removal and,
therefore, are not affected by the retroactive limitations.'
Id. at 1079 (citing Transcript of Senate Committee on Environment and Public
Works Mark-up Session of S. 1480, 194-95, June 26, 1980).
118. See id. See CERCLA §§ 107(f), 110(d), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(f), 9611(d)
(1988 & Supp. V 1993).
119. See Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. at 1079.
120. See id.
121. See id.
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ministrative actions. Therefore, actions necessary to protect public health, welfare or the environment should begin
as soon as feasible. The non-regulatory authorities for response provided in this Act and other laws should be exercised prior to completion of any necessary planning,
administrative, and rulemaking responsibilities. However,
once completed, such statutorily required planning, administration and final rulemaking2 2 shall govern subsequent
government response actions.1
Shell Oil claimed that this passage indicates that actions
prior to CERCLA's enactment were not "response actions" for
which recovery can be awarded. 123 The court found that the
Senate intended government response actions to commence
as quickly as feasible because the hazardous waste problem is
immediate and severe. 12 4 Thus, where Congress intends a liability provision to have only prospective execution, like nat1 25
ural resources damages, Congress uses explicit language.
Here, because Congress did not explicitly restrict liability for
response costs incurred prior to enactment, the court concluded that consistent with the statutory scheme, CERCLA
26
authorizes recovery of pre-enactment response costs.'
c.

United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical
12 7
& Chemical Co. (Northeastern)

In Northeastern, the court examined the language of the
statute in concluding that CERCLA is retroactive. 28 The
court conceded that CERCLA's language does not expressly
provide for retroactivity. 129 However, the court used CERCLA's statutory language to support two conclusions: (1)
122.
Works
123.
124.
125.

Id. (citing Transcript of Senate Committee on Environment and Public
Mark-up Session of S. 1480, 62, June 26-27, 1980).
See id.
See id.
See CERCLA §§ 107(f), 111(d), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(f), 9611(d) (1988 &

Supp. V 1993).

126.
127.
128.
129.

See Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. at 1079.
810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 731.
See id. at 732.
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130
Congress intended CERCLA to have a retroactive effect;
and (2) the statutory scheme of CERCLA is both remedial
13 1
and retroactive.
Unlike Georgeoff and Shell Oil, the Northeastern court
cited specific language used in the relevant liability provision
that refers to actions and conditions in the past tense. 32 For
example, section 107 of CERCLA reads, in part, "any person
who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated,"' 33 "any person who ... arranged with a
transporter for transport for disposal," 3 4a and "any person
who ... accepted any hazardous substances for transport to
13 5
. . sites selected by such person."
Second, the court found that CERCLA has a general
scheme that is remedial and retroactive, thereby authorizing
the EPA under section 106 of CERCLA to force responsible
parties to clean up inactive hazardous waste sites.' 3 6 Furthermore, the court concluded that CERCLA authorizes federal, state, and local governments, as well as private parties
13 7
to clean up the sites, and subsequently seek cleanup costs.
*

138

d. Landgrafv. USI Film Products (Landgraf)

Recently, there has been skepticism regarding the retroactivity of CERCLA due to the Supreme Court's decision in
Landgraf.139 The Landgraf decision significantly relates to
130. See id. at 732-33.
131. See id. at 733.
132. See id. at 732. See, e.g., Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1069-73 (D. Colo.
1985); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 220 (W.D.
Mo. 1985); United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F.
Supp. 984 (D.S.C. 1984); United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp.
1249, 1259 (S.D. Ill. 1989); United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1111-12
(D.N.J. 1983); Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1312 (N.D. Ohio 1983); United
States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 556 F. Supp. 54, 57 (N.D. 111.1982); United
States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1113-14 (D. Minn. 1982).
133. CERCLA § 107(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
134. Id. § 107(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3).
135. Id. § 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4).
136. See Northeastern,810 F.2d at 733.
137. See id. at 733. See CERCLA §§ 104, 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9604, 9607.
138. 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994).
139. See generally Olin, 927 F. Supp. 1502 (S.D. Ala. 1996).
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the Court's conclusion in Olin14o because the Court confirmed
the approach for determining the retroactive effect of a
14 1
statute.
Landgrafinvolved the 1991 Civil Rights Act 14 2 that created a right to recover compensatory 143 and punitive 1 4 damages for certain violations of Title VII, and provided for a jury
trial if such damages were claimed. 145 The Court held that if
a Title VII case was pending on appeal when the 1991 Civil
Rights Act was enacted, the statute did not apply. 146 As
stated in Landgraf,"when a case implicates a federal statute
enacted after the events in a suit, the Court's first task is to
determine whether Congress expressly prescribed the stat14 7
ute's proper reach."
If Congress has not explicitly prescribed retroactivity,
courts must determine if the new statute is in fact retroactive. 148 Under Landgraf,if the legislative intent and the language do, not clearly indicate retroactivity, then the
presumption against it must be applied.149 The suggested
criteria included whether retroactive application would impair rights of a party possessed when the action occurred, expand a party's liability for prior conduct, or compel new
duties to transactions already concluded. 150 If the statute
140. See id.
141. See, e.g., United States v. NL Indus., Inc., 936 F. Supp. 545 (S.D. Ill.
1996).
142. Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-d (1964),
amended by 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -e-17. (1991).
143. "Compensatory damages" "compensate the injured party for the injury
sustained, and nothing more; such as will simply make good or replace the loss
caused by the wrong or injury." BLAci's LAw DICTIONARY 390 (6th ed. 1990).
144. "Punitive" or "exemplary damages" are "damages on an increased scale,
awarded to the plaintiff over and above what will barely compensate him for his
property loss, where the wrong done to him was aggravated by circumstances of
violence, oppression, malice, fraud, or wanton and wicked conduct on the part of
the defendant, and are intended to solace the plaintiff. . .

."

See id.

145. Landgraf,114 S. Ct. at 1483 (1994).
146. See id.
147. United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., Nos. 87-CV-920, 91-CV-1132,
1996 WL 637559, at 3 (N.D.N.Y. 1996).
148. Landgraf,114 S.Ct. at 1504.
149. Id. at 1483.
150. See id. at 1505.
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was applied retroactively, the traditional presumption was
that it did not govern absent distinct congressional intent in
15 1
favor of such a result.
Landgrafprovided a test for determining whether retroactivity should be applied. 152 The test is as follows:
(1) to determine (a) whether Congress has expressly stated
the statutes reach and (b) if not, whether the text and the
legislative history have clearly prescribed Congress' intent
to apply the provision retroactively; (2) if not, to determine
whether the provision actually has 'retroactive effect on
the party or parties in the litigation'; and (3) if so, to apply
the traditional presumption against retroactivity-absent
153
a clear congressional intent to the contrary.
Thus, the Landgrafdecision not only relied on express retro154
activity, but the Court looked to clear congressional intent.
The Court concluded that "requiring clear intent assures that
Congress itself has affirmatively considered the potential unfairness of retroactive application and determined that it is
15 5
an acceptable price to pay for countervailing benefits."
The majority did not limit its analysis to express language; rather, the Court included legislative history and the
statute's text to define clear congressional intent. 56 To satisfy the Landgraf criteria, a successful argument must consist of both textual and structural arguments because
15 7
CERCLA does not have express language.

151. See id.
152. See Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1511.
153. Id.
154. Landgraf 114 S. Ct. at 1500.
155. Id.
156. See Nevada ex rel. Dep't of Transp. v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 691,
702 (D. Nev. 1996).
157. See id.
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158
Commerce Clause

There has been some discrepancy among decisions as to
the extent of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause. 159
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution empowers Congress to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States and with the Indian
Tribes ... ."160 Until 1937, the Commerce Clause had only
been interpreted to allow Congress to regulate interstate
commerce. 16 1 However, in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp.162 (Jones & Laughlin), the Court held that "intrastate
activities [that] have such a close and substantial relation to
interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstruc16 3
tions" are within Congress' power to regulate.
a.

164
Wickard v. Filburn (Wickard)

In 1937, the Court applied this new standard in Wickard.165 The Court clarified the power of the Commerce
Clause and held that
the commerce power is not confined in its exercise to the
regulation of commerce among the states. It extends to
158. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1 (1824).
159. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995).
160. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
161. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 1.
162. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
163. Id. at 37. In an attempt to assist employees, Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act to prevent unfair hiring practices and lockouts. See
id. at 22-23. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation refused to comply with the
Act, arguing that: (1) it is not a regulation of interstate commerce; (2) production employees ate not regulated by the federal government; and (3) sections of
the Act violate the Constitution of the United States. See id. at 24. In rejecting
the first argument, the Supreme Court held that where a subject matter affects
commerce, it is a national matter within Congress' power to regulate. See id. at
37. Thereafter, in holding that production is the mechanism that allows a commodity to enter the stream of commerce, the Court upheld the Act because "it
presents in a most striking way the close and intimate relation which a manufacturing industry may have to interstate commerce and... Congress had [the]
constitutional authority to safeguard [employees' rights]

....

"

Id. at 43.

164. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
165. Id.
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those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce, or the exertion of the power of Congress over it, as
to make regulation of them appropriate means to attainment of a legitimate end, the effective execution of the
16 6
granted power to regulate interstate commerce.
In Wickard, Congress set a quota for the amount of wheat
grown on every farm in the United States, by creating the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938.167 Pursuant to the Act,
the wheat raised in excess of the quota was subject to a penalty per bushel. 168 The defendant, a farmer, challenged Congress' right to set a quota on wheat, which he raised for
personal consumption, on the grounds that it was a purely
local activity. 16 9 The Court held that Congress' power "over
interstate commerce is plenary and complete in itself, [and]
may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no
70
limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitution."'
b.

17 1
United States v. Lopez (Lopez)

In 1995, the Supreme Court decided Lopez. 172 Here, the
Court again addressed the issue of Congress' Commerce
Clause authority. 17 3 In Lopez, a twelfth grade student arrived at high school with a concealed .38 caliber handgun and
five bullets. 174 Lopez was charged with violating the GunFree School Zone Act of 1990 (Act), 175 which made knowingly
possessing a firearm in a school zone a federal offense. 17 6 Lopez claimed that Congress exceeded its power to legislate
under the Commerce Clause 17 7 because the Act neither regu166. Id. at 124 (quoting United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S.
110, 119 (1942)).
167. Id. at 115.
168. See id. at 114-15.
169. See id. at 114.
170. Id. at 123.
171. 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995).
172. Id.
173. See id. at 1625.
174. See id. at 1626.
175. Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4844 (1990).
176. See Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1626.
177. See id.
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lated a commercial activity, nor contained a requirement that
the firearm possession be connected in any way to interstate
commerce. 178
The issue in Lopez was whether Congress could regulate
gun possession under the Commerce Clause even though gun
possession is not a commercial activity, nor does it relate to
interstate commerce. 179 The Court enunciated three categories of acceptable congressional Commerce Clause regulation:
(1) use of channels of interstate commerce; (2) regulation and
protection of the instrumentality of interstate commerce, or
persons, or things in interstate commerce even though the
threat may come from intrastate activities; and (3) regulation
of those activities having a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. 180
In light of this framework, the Court found that the Act
did not fit into the first two categories because there was
neither use of interstate commerce, nor an attempt to prohibit an item to travel in interstate commerce.' 8 ' Therefore,
the Court analyzed the final category: whether interstate
l 2
commerce was substantially affected.'
The Court determined that the Act was a criminal statute and, thus, did not relate to commerce or economic enterprise.1 8 3 Therefore, the Court reasoned that "it [the Act]
cannot be sustained under our cases upholding regulations of
activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial
transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially af18 4
fects interstate commerce.
Next, the Court found that the statute did not contain a
jurisdictional element showing that firearm possession affected commerce.' 8 5 Although the jurisdictional element is
178. See id.
179. Id.
180. See id. at 1629.
181. See id. at 1630.
182. See id.
183. See id. at 1630-31.
184. Id.
185. See id. See also United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) (holding
that the possession component of the statute in question required an additional
nexus to interstate commerce).
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not a part of the test enunciated in Lopez, the Court found it
persuasive in relation to this criminal Act.18 6 Ultimately, the
Court determined that the possession of a gun in a school
zone was not an economic activity.' 8 7 Furthermore, even if
this activity occurred elsewhere, it still would not have any
concrete relation to interstate commerce.' 88 Therefore, the
Gun-Free School Zone Act was declared unconstitutional be89
cause it exceeded Congress' Commerce Clause authority.
III.

United States v. Olin Corp. (Olin)19o

In light of the recent Supreme Court decisions in Landgraf and Lopez, the Olin court evaluated whether CERCLA
should still be upheld.1 9 1
A.

Facts and Procedural History

The United States filed a complaint under CERCLA
against Olin Corp., a Virginia corporation operating a chemical plant. 9 2 Along with the complaint, the parties filed a consent decree.' 93 The government sought to recover cleanup
costs due to mercury 9 4 and chloroform 9 5 (hazardous sub97
stances) 19 6 that were allegedly released.
186. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631. The Government conceded that neither
the statute nor the legislative histories contain any evidence regarding the statute's affect on interstate commerce. See id.
187. See id. at 1634.
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. 927 F. Supp. 1502 (S.D. Ala. 1996).
191. Id.
192. See id. at 1503.
193. See id. A consent decree is "a judgment entered by consent of the parties whereby the defendant agrees to stop alleged illegal activity without admitting guilt or wrongdoing .... Upon approval of such agreement by the court the
government's action against the defendant is dropped." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 410-11 (6th ed. 1990).
194. Mercury is listed as a hazardous waste in 40 C.F.R. § 261.33 (1996). See
id.
195. Chloroform is listed as a hazardous waste in 40 C.F.R § 261, App. VIII.
(1996). See id.
196. See supra note 11.
197. See Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1504.

29

430

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15

The government alleged that there were two actionable
sites at the Olin property; however, this action only involved
Site 1.198 The government asserted that from 1952-1974, Site
1 was used as a mercury-cell chloralkali plant, which released water containing mercury into Site 2.199 Then, in
1955, the plant operated a crop-protection-chemicals plant
that was responsible for discharging wastewater into Site 2
until 1974.200 Due to the plant's operations, mercury and
chloroform were allegedly released into Site 1.201 Both plants
ceased operating in 1982.202 Thereafter, in 1984 the EPA
3
placed the Olin Site on the NPL. 20
Both parties signed the proposed consent decree and
jointly moved for the court to enter the decree. 20 4 Although,
Olin was willing to enter into the decree, the court asserted
that it had a duty to "not only to determine whether its factual and legal determinations are reasonable, but also to ensure that the decree does not violate the Constitution, a
federal statute or the controlling jurisprudence." 20 5 Accordingly, the court required the parties to file briefs discussing
whether CERCLA, as applied to this case, followed the
Supreme Court's decision in Lopez regarding the Commerce
Clause. 20 6 After the court directed the parties to file briefs on
the Commerce Clause issue, the defendant then raised the
issue of CERCLA's retroactivity, claiming that "Congress did
not intend for CERCLA to be retroactive and that if it did,
CERCLA violates the Due Process Clause and unconstitutionally delegates legislative power to the EPA."20 7

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 1506-07.
See id. at 1507.
See id.
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Reasoning and Holding

According to precedent, a court should dispose of a case
on non-constitutional grounds before deciding a constitutional issue whenever possible. 20 8 Therefore, the court reviewed the statutory question of whether Congress intended
CERCLA to apply retroactively before considering constitutional issues. 20 9 The precedent regarding the proper test to
be applied in determining if a retroactive application of a
statute is permissible is contradictory. 2 10 The Olin court
agreed that in the past a retroactive application of CERCLA
was permissible. 2 11 However, in light of the Supreme Court's
decision in Landgraf,which addressed and resolved the discrepancy of retroactive application, 21 2 the court held that
21 3
CERCLA must no longer be applied in this manner.
First, the Olin court explained that Landgraf "demolishes the interpretive premise on which prior cases had concluded CERCLA is retroactive." 2 14 The Landgraf decision
was viewed as reaffirming "the traditional presumption
against retroactiv[ity] ."215 Thus, the court dismissed the earlier influential case Georgeoff, asserting that Georgeoff did exactly what Landgrafrejected. 2 16 That is, the court explained
208. See, e.g., Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936).
209. See, e.g., Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1507 (citing Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 347).
The Eleventh Circuit has never squarely addressed whether CERCLA is retroactive, but in Virginia PropertiesInc. v. Home Ins. Co., 74 F.3d 1131 (11th Cir.
1996), in dicta, the court suggested that CERCLA was retroactive. See id. at
1132. However, in Redwing Carriers,Inc. v. SarlandApartments, Ltd., 875 F.
Supp 1545 (11th Cir. 1995), although the parties did not argue the issue of retroactivity, the court did not apply certain regulations retroactively. See id. at
1564.
210. See Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. 268 (1969); Bowen v.
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988); Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 (1974); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1
(1976).
211. See Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1507.
212. See id. at 1508.
213. See id. at 1519.
214. Id. at 1508.
215. Id.
216. See id. at 1509.
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that Georgeoff seemed to apply a presumption in favor of
2 17
retroactivity.
The court also asserted that two other cases, Shell and
Northeastern, enunciated their own analyses and gave "little
regard for the presumption" against retroactivity. 2 18 The
court concluded that Landgraf clarifies the analysis of retroactivity and impacts Olin significantly; thus, the government's argument that Landgraf is unremarkable was found
21 9
to be credible.
The Olin court considered the test enunciated in Landgraf.220 In Landgraf,the Supreme Court held that if a statute does not explicitly state that it should be applied
retroactively, the court must determine if the statute should
be retroactive with non-express text and legislative history. 2 21 Here, the Olin court found that there was no express
language in the statute;2 2 2 therefore, a presumption against
2 23
retroactivity was applied.
Next, to determine if this presumption could be lifted,
the court looked at non-express statutory language, focusing
on sections 106(a) 2 24 and 107(a). 22 5 The court found that
under Landgraf,the government's argument that section 106
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 1508.
Id. at 1512.
See id. at 1511.
Id. at 1512.
See id. at 1516.
CERCLA provides:
In addition to any other action taken by a State or local government, when the President determines that there may be an imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare
or the environment because of an actual or threatened release of a
hazardous substance from a facility, he may require the Attorney
General of the United States to secure such relief as may be necessary to abate such danger or threat, and the district in which the
threat occurs shall have jurisdiction to grant such relief as the public interest and the equities of the case may require. The President
may also, after notice to the affected State take other action under
this section including, but not limited to, issuing such orders as
may be necessary to protect public health and welfare and the
environment.
CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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contains language that demonstrates congressional intent to
authorize retroactivity fails. 2 2 6 The government's brief relied
on Northeastern's finding that "the language used in the key
liability provision, CERCLA § 107 . . .refers to actions and
conditions in past tense."2 2 7 The Olin court, however, highlighted the Georgeoff analysis that explained that the use of
228
past tense was not dispositive.
Then, the court analyzed the legislative history of CERCLA. 2 29 The court refused to follow prior holdings from other
jurisdictions rejecting the body of case law promoted by the
government regarding retroactivity. 230 The court emphasized the fact that the prior decisions were not considered in
light of Landgraf.2 31 Moreover, the court suggested that the
failure of Congress not to expressly include retroactive effect
was deliberate. 23 2 Additionally, the court addressed the limit
on retroactive recovery of response costs whether incurred
233
before or after CERCLA's enactment.
Second, the court attempted to distinguish between the
effect of the statute and the intent of Congress. 23 4 In comparing the compensatory damages analysis of the Landgrafopinion with the financial liabilities of CERCLA, the court
claimed that "the new damages remedy in Section 102. . . is
the kind of provision that does not apply to events antedating
225. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. See generally CERCLA
§ 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
226. See Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1513. This may be due to the fact that the
right arguments were not made. The Olin court noted: "The Justice Department devotes little attention to statutory language as evidence of congressional
intent." Id.
227. Id. (citing Northeastern, 810 F.2d 726, 773 (8th Cir. 1986)).
228. However, the Georgeoff court did not assert that the language was not
evidence of congressional intent, it merely claimed that the statutory argument
was not enough to overcome the presumption [against] retroactivity. Id. at
1513.
229. See id.
230. See id. at 1514.
231. See id.
232. See id.
233. See Nevada ex rel. Dep't of Transp. v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 691,
702 (D. Nev. 1996).
234. See Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1516.
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its enactment in the absence of clear congressional intent."2 35
Third, the court determined that the presumption against
retroactivity should apply. 23 6 In interpreting Landgraf,this
court determined that "a provision for punitive damages
should not be construed as retroactive unless the language
forces that conclusion because the court must then confront
237
substantial constitutional questions which follow."
The Olin court concluded that CERCLA contains no explicit language of retroactivity and no language that clearly
indicates a congressional intent of retroactivity that is required by Landgraf.23 s The court rejected the government's
attempt to argue that the key provisions of CERCLA contain
language that refers to the past tense. 2 39 Next, the court
looked to legislative history of CERCLA and determined that
the issue of retroactivity was not precisely addressed. 2 40 The
court concluded that
[n]othing presented in the Justice Department['s] brief or
pre-Landgrafcases concerning the statutory language of
CERCLA or its legislative history demonstrated that Section 107(a) (and/or Section 106(a) as related to it in this
case) is 'the sort of provision that must be understood to
operate retroactively because a contrary reading would
render it ineffective.'24 1
Next, the court addressed the constitutionality of the
statute in light of the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Lopez. 24 2 In Lopez, the Court held that "the federal
gun statute at issue attempted to exercise police power over
matters historically falling within the jurisdiction of local
government." 24 3 The Olin court claimed that Lopez requires:
"(1) that the statute itself regulate economic activity, which
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id. (citing Lopez, 114 S. Ct. 1624 (1995)).
See id. at 1518 (citing Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1507-08 (1994)).
Id. at 1517.
See id. at 1513.
See id.
See id. at 1514.
Id. at 1519 (citing Landgraf,114 S. Ct. at 1507-08) (emphasis added).
115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1522.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss1/12

34

U.S. v. OLIN CORP.

19971

435

activity 'substantially affects' interstate commerce, and (2)
that the statute include a 'jurisdictional element which would
ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the [statute] in
2
question affects interstate commerce.'" 44
In applying Lopez to the present case, the Olin court similarly believed that the object of regulation was not economic
activity or commerce 2 45 because the plants at issue had not
been in operation since 1982.246 The court held that an activity must not only have a substantial affect on interstate commerce, but must also be an economic activity; thus, the
"application of CERCLA to this case exceeds the power given
to Congress under the Commerce Clause."2 47 Moreover, the
court claimed that: (1) CERCLA regulates in the area of national police power, which Lopez forbids; 2 48 and (2) the statute does not allow for a case-by-case inquiry. 2 49 Ultimately,
the court determined that like the Gun-Free School Zone Act
in Lopez, CERCLA exceeded Congress' Commerce Clause
25 0
authority.
IV.

Analysis

First, CERCLA clearly passes the Landgraf test 2 5 1 for
three reasons: (1) language; (2) structure; and (3) legislative
history. Although there is no express retroactive language in
CERCLA, it is clear that CERCLA was intended by Congress
to be retroactive. 2 52 Second, CERCLA is not an abuse of Con244. Id. at 1532.
245. Id.
246. See id.
247. See id. at 1523.
248. See id. at 1533.
249. See id.
250. See id.
251. In Landgraf, a test was developed that solved the retroactivity quandary. Landgraf,114 S. Ct. at 1505. First, the Court examines any statutory
language that specifically describes the statute's reach. See id. If none can be
found, the Court must decipher whether applying the statute would result in a
retroactive effect. See id. If so, the Court applies a presumption against Congress intending such a result. See id. Lastly, the Court examines the statutory
construction and legislative history to ascertain whether Congress clearly intended a retroactive effect. See id.
252. See, e.g., supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
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gress' Commerce Clause authority. 253 CERCLA passes the
Lopez "substantial affects" test, and is not in any way analogous to the Gun-Free School Zone Act in Lopez.
A.

Retroactivity

Although the Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of retroactivity in Landgraf,25 4 the Court has not addressed this issue in the context of CERCLA.255 Prior to
Landgraf,there was a discrepancy among Supreme Court decisions concerning the proper test to determine when a statute could be applied retroactively. 25 6 In Landgraf,the Court
recognized this problem and explained that the Court has
uniformly held that a presumption against retroactivity
should apply. 2 57 Thus, if there is no express language, clear
25 8
congressional intent governs.
In applying the Landgraf retroactivity test, the Olin
court asserted that the pre-Olin decisions holding CERCLA
retroactive were obsolete because these opinions did not apply the requirements for retroactivity established in Landgraf.2 59 However, no court has agreed with the Olin
decision. 2 60 Consequently, the Olin court's interpretation of
Landgraf created an anomaly in the law regarding CERCLA's application.
Prior to Olin, federal courts applied a presumption
against retroactivity, and then rebutted that presumption
with an examination of statutory language and legislative
history to determine if there was a clear congressional intent
to apply CERCLA retroactively. 2 6 1 The Olin court attempted
to illustrate how past retroactive arguments now fail under
253. See, e.g., United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., Nos. 87-CV-920, 91CV-1132, 1996 WL 937559 (N.D.N.Y. 1996); United States v. NL Indus., Inc.,
936 F. Supp. 545 (S.D. Ill. 1996).
254. See Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1507.
255. See id. at 1507.
256. See supra Part II.B.1.
257. Landgraf,114 S. Ct. at 1496.
258. See id.
259. Id.
260. See supra notes 7, 25 and accompanying text.
261. See Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1302 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
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Olin by using three leading cases: Georgeoff,2 62 Shell Oil,263
and Northeastern.26 4 Although these cases hold that CERCIA is retroactive, the analysis to achieve retroactivity varies because the courts focused on different elements of the
statute and legislative history to rebut the presumption of
retroactivity.
Since the Landgrafdecision, the only court in the Nation
to conclude that the retroactivity test has changed is the Olin
court. As an initial matter, Landgrafdid not set forth a new
rule of law regarding retroactive application of a statute.
Rather, it clarified the traditional presumption against retroactivity. Thus, the substantive examination in the pre-Olin
cases is analogous to the Landgraftest. Therefore, the Olin
court improperly dismissed Georgeoff and its progeny.
Although there is no express language to verify CERCLA's retroactivity, it is evident from the language, structure, and legislative history that Congress intended CERCLA
to operate retroactively. Retroactivity is consistent with the
purpose of CERCLA, which is "t[o] provide for liability, compensation, cleanup, and emergency response for hazardous
substances released into the environment and the cleanup of
inactive hazardous waste disposal sites." 2 65 CERCLA was
created to clean up hazardous waste sites and allocate financial responsibility to achieve these goals. 2 66 Congress intended liability to attach to improper disposal actions
occurring before the enactment date of 1980.267
CERCLA itself provides numerous examples of clear evidence of congressional intent. CERCLA's civil liability provi262. Id. at 1300.
263. 605 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Colo. 1985).
264. 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986). In Northeastern, the court concedes that
CERCLA does not expressly provide for retroactivity, however, the court uses
the statutory language argument in two ways: (1) "it is manifestly clear that
Congress intended CERCLA to have retroactive effect"; and (2) "the statutory
scheme itself is overwhelmingly remedial and retroactive." Id. at 732-33.
265. Pub. L. No. 96-510, at 1, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980).
266. See S. REP. No. 96-848 (1980), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 2, at 13.
267. See, e.g., Cooper Indus. v. Agway, Inc., No. 92-CV-0748, 1996 WL
550128 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that the language, structure, purpose and legislative history establish clear congressional intent).
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sion, section 107,268 sets out three distinct forms of liability:
(1) "all costs of removal or remedial action"; 26 9 (2) "any other
necessary costs of response"; 2 70 and (3) natural resource damages. 27 1 In contrast, CERCLA provides two natural resource
damages provisions: 2 72 (1) section 107(f)(1) provides that
"there shall be no recovery . . . [where] such damages re273
sulted have occurred wholly before December 11, 1980";
and (2) section 111(d)(1) provides that "[n]o money in the
Fund may be used . ..where the injury, destruction, or loss
of natural resources and the release of a hazardous substance
from which such damages resulted have occurred wholly
before December 11, 1980." 2 74 Thus, CERCLA specifically
limits natural resources damages to a prospective application, but fails to limit response costs in the same manner.
This provides evidence that Congress intended a retroactive
application of response costs.
Furthermore, the above mentioned liability provision is
in past tense. Section 107 contains language such as: (1)
"owned or operated any facility" at the time of hazardous
waste disposal; 2 75 (2) "arranged for disposal or treatment" of
hazardous waste; 27 6 and (3) "accepted" hazardous waste for
transport. 2 7 7 Thus, this language is further evidence of Con27
gress' intent for a retroactive application of CERCLA. 8
268. CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
269. Id. § 107(a)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A).
270. Id. § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
271. Id. § 107(a)(4)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C).
272. See Nevada ex rel. Dep't. of Transp. v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 691,
701 (D. Nev. 1996).
273. CERCLA § 107(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1).
274. Id. § 111(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9611(d) (1).
275. Id. § 107(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2).
276. Id. § 107(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3).
277. Id. § 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4).
278. The Olin court completely discarded the negative implication argument
because the Court in Landgraf addressed a similar negative inference argument and it was rejected. However, Landgraf is distinguishable because the
provisions emphasized were merely a minor part of the statute. See Nevada ex
rel. Dep't of Transp. v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 691 (D. Nev. 1996). Additionally, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and CERCLA are starkly different. The
statutory construction and the historical background are especially important
due to the political circumstances surrounding the enactment of CERCLA. See
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Additionally, section 103(c) provides that "[wlithin one
hundred and eighty days after December 11, 1980, any person who owns or operates or who at the time of disposal
owned or operated... [a facility must] ... notify the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency of the existence of such facility... "279 It is reasonable to infer from this
language that Congress intended for CERCLA's retroactive
application. As shown, there are no time limitations in CERCLA's language restricting CERCLA to a prospective application, except in the above mentioned natural resources
liability section.
Moreover, the general scheme of environmental statutes
implicates retroactive effect due to the void CERCLA was enacted to fill. 280 RCRA operates prospectively, to prohibit environmental catastrophes such as Love Canal. 28 1 Congress
specifically intended to create a mechanism to address the environmental degradation that occurred in the past.28 2 In
light of the background in which CERCLA was created, to interpret CERCLA in a prospective manner would clearly be
ineffective.
B.

The Constitutionality of CERCLA

28 3
The Commerce Clause is fully applicable to CERCLA.
However, the Olin court ruled that "CERCLA cannot be applied to regulate intrastate groundwater contamination
under the Commerce Clause." 28 4 The court's main constitu-

id. (citing J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 48.03 (5th
ed. 1992)).
279. CERCLA § 103(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(c).
280. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, at 22, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supranote 2, at Vol. II, 53. See also Nevada, 925 F. Supp. at 702; United States
v. Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785, 792-93 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (finding that CERCLA was
"designed to plug in the gaps" in existing anti-pollution laws) (citing Nevada,
925 F. Supp. 691).
281. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
283. See Hodel v.Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S.
264, 282 (1981) (holding that the Commerce Clause is broad enough to permit
congressional findings demonstrating the effects of unregulated surface mining
on interstate commerce). See Brief, supra note 8, at 17.
284. Brief, supra note 8, at 17-18.
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tional argument relies on the Supreme Court's decision in
2 85
Lopez.
The Lopez Court narrowly read Congress' . Commerce
Clause authority. 28 6 This narrow reading is limited in focus
and does not reach CERCLA. The Lopez Court premised its
argument on the three factors 28 7 that it enumerated regarding the regulatory power of Congress. First, it must be
remembered that the Act in Lopez was a criminal gun control
statute. 28 8 The Lopez Court found that the Act was "a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to with commerce
....

",289

CERCLA does not include any mention of commerce

in its text or legislative history. 290 Unlike the Act at issue in
Lopez, CERCLA is a comprehensive mechanism for responding to releases of hazardous waste and for assessing liability
against those responsible for the pollution. 29 1 Additionally,
CERCLA sets standards and creates schedules for cleanups,
and deters improper disposals through its liability provisions.2 92 Moreover, the activities that CERCLA affects have
an impact on the economy (i.e. fishing industry, agriculture,
domestic and industrial water supplies, livestock protection
29 3
and recreation).
Second, the issue in Olin was that groundwater was released which contained mercury, thereby contaminating
other sites. 2 94 The Supreme Court has concluded that
285. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1624, 1630 (1995).
286. Interview with Bennett Gershman, Professor of Law at Pace University

School of Law (Nov. 1, 1996).
287. Lopez articulates the principles necessary for Congress to regulate commerce: (1) "the use of channels of interstate commerce"; (2) when regulating and
protecting the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate
activities; (3) authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a
substantial relationship to interstate commerce. Brief, supra note 12, at 18 (citing Lopez, 155 S. Ct. at 1629-30).
288. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1624.

289. Id.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

See Brief, supra note 11, at 17-18.
See id. at 18.
United States v. NL Indus., Inc., 936 F. Supp. 545, 562 (S.D. Ill. 1996).
See id.
Olin, 927 F. Supp. 1502, 1504 (S.D. Ala. 1996).
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groundwater is an article of interstate commerce. 295 Therefore, groundwater is subject to congressional regulation. 296
As shown, the Gun-Free School Zone Act in Lopez is completely different than CERCLA; thus, it is unreasonable to
apply the analysis of Lopez to Olin.
Additionally, the Olin court claimed that the activities
being regulated must be economic; 297 however, the Lopez
Court did not indicate that the activities need be purely economic. 298 The Supreme Court has held that solid or liquid
waste is an item of commerce, which is clearly economic activity.2 99 Thus, the wastewater from the Olin Site, which con-

tained hazardous waste, is an item of commerce.
Third, the Lopez argument does not apply because, unlike CERCLA, that Act did not have a "widespread" affect on
economic activity. Clearly, CERCLA falls within this criterion because, as in Wickard, the activity in Olin had a substantial affect on interstate commerce. The Olin court
ignored that "the Supreme Court consistently looks to the
'class of activities' regulated by the legislation in the aggregate, rather than the individual activities in the particular
case."

30 0

Finally, the Olin court held that CERCLA fails the jurisdictional requirement of the Lopez test. 30 However, Lopez
does not require that every statute pass the jurisdictional element in order to pass constitutional muster. 30 2 Moreover,
unlike the Act in Lopez, CERCLA is a civil statute, which
clearly does not impose criminal liability. 30 3 Pursuant to the
Lopez test, it is enough that a statute pass the "substantially

295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

See Sporhase v. Nebraska, 485 U.S. 941 (1982).
See id.
See Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1531.
See id. at 1532-33.
See City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
Brief, supra note 8, at 20-21.
See supra Part II.B.2.b. See also Brief, supra note 8, at 19-20.
See Brief, supra note 8, at 19-20.
See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
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affects" element. 30 4 Therefore, if the Lopez test is applied
properly, CERCLA would be deemed constitutional. Thus,
the Olin court misinterpreted the Lopez decision and analysis. Accordingly, the district court's opinion was reversed in
March of this year.
V.

The Appeal

On March 25, 1997, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit overturned the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama in United
States v. Olin Corp. (Olin II).305 The court reviewed de novo
whether applying CERCLA to onsite contamination was in
violation of the Congress' Commerce Clause authority and
whether CERCLA can be applied retroactively.3 0 6 To review,
the district court dismissed the government's complaint
against Olin holding that the Constitution prohibits enforcement of CERCLA against a party whose conduct was limited
to its own property. 30 7 Additionally, the court held that CER30 8
CLA's liability cleanup provisions apply only prospectively.
On appeal, Olin again characterized the CERCLA enforcement action as being beyond the reach of Congress' Commerce Clause authority. 30 9 Olin asserted that CERCLA
enforcement was not justified because there was no evidence
that its onsite disposal activities affected interstate commerce. 3 10 Additionally, Olin argued that its disposal activities were not economic in nature and, therefore, escaped
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause. 3 11 Accordingly, Olin asserted that the district court's decision
3 12
should be upheld.
304. See id. See also Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1520 (11th Cir. 1995)
(holding that legislation regulates activity that substantially affects interstate
commerce and is therefore within Congress' constitutional power).
305. United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997).
306. See id. at 1509.
307. See id. at 1508.
308. See id.
309. See id. at 1511.
310. See id.
311. See id.
312. See id.
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Next, Olin argued that the district court's ruling on ret-

roactivity should be affirmed.3 13 Olin asserted that under
Landgraf,no statute can be applied in a retroactive manner
without a showing of clear intent by Congress. 314 Olin argued that CERCLA does not contain explicit language that
provides for retroactive liability for cleanup liability provisions. 315 To the contrary, Olin stated that Congress intended
to impose liability merely on "future former owners and operators"; that is, those parties that would become "former" after
December 11, 1980.316 Olin conceded that CERCLA applied
to sites contaminated prior to this date; however, costs incurred for the cleanup of such sites would be borne by industry and private taxpayers. 317 Furthermore, Olin argued that
CERCLA's legislative history concerning retroactivity should
be disregarded because a compromise bill was passed. 318 For
these reasons, Olin maintained that the district court's holding in regard to retroactivity should be affirmed.
The government argued that the Commerce Clause can
be used to regulate hazardous waste site cleanups regardless
319
of whether hazardous substance migration has occurred.
The government stated, "Congress' determination that contamination from hazardous waste sites as a class substantially affects interstate commerce allows regulation of any
activity that falls within that class without further proof of
320
an effect on commerce."
Additionally, the government contended that Congress
expressed the intent to apply response costs retroactively.321
The government asserted that the express limitation on the
recovery of natural resources would have no purpose unless
Congress intended that a similar limitation would not apply
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

See id. at 1512.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1513.
See id. at 1514.
See id. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
See Olin 11, 107 F.3d at 1510.
11th Cir. Finds CERCLA Retroactive, Constitutional, 10 MEALEY'S LiTIG. REP.: SUPERFUND 3, Apr. 14, 1997.
321. See Olin 11, 107 F.3d at 1512.
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to the recovery of response costs.322 Furthermore, the government argued that the instant dispute was distinguishable
from Landgraf because the retroactive sections of the Civil
Rights Act were "comparatively minor and narrow provisions
in a long and complex statute."3 23 In comparison, the government argued that the liability provisions of CERCLA are
32 4
clearly of "central importance to the statute."
The court found that hazardous waste disposal is the
type of activity that substantially affects interstate commerce. 32 5 Accordingly, the court held that "although Congress did not include in CERCLA either legislative findings or
a jurisdictional element, the statute remains valid as applied
in this case because it regulates a class of activities that substantially affects interstate commerce." 32 6 Furthermore, the
court rejected Olin's claim regarding a lack of harm to interstate commerce. 32 7 The court concluded that the regulation
of onsite waste disposal is consistent with Congress' objective
328
to protect interstate commerce from pollution.
Secondly, the court held that the language 32 9 and legislative history of CERCLA 3 3° "confirms that Congress intended
to impose retroactive liability for cleanup." 3 3 ' The court
found that Congress "targeted both current and former owners and operators of contaminated sites" as a result of specific
language in the statute. 3 32 Additionally, the court found that
legislative history indicates that CERCLA was intended to be
applied retroactively. 33 3 The court concluded that although a
. 322. See id. (referring to CERCLA § 111(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9611(d)(1) (1988 &
Supp. V 1993).

323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.

See Olin H, 107 F.3d at 1512.
Id.
See id. at 1510.
Id.
See id. at 1511.
See id.
See id. at 1513.
See id. at 1514.
See id.
Id.
See id.
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compromise bill existed, the compromise did not relate to the
334
retroactive cleanup of contaminated sites.
VI.

Conclusion

No court since Olin has followed the Olin court's analysis
or findings. As shown on appeal, 3 35 the Olin court incorrectly
held that according to the decisions in Landgraf and Lopez,
CERCLA is not retroactive nor unconstitutional. The Olin
court misconstrued both Supreme Court holdings. First,
Congress did not exceed its power under the Commerce
Clause because CERCLA regulates economic activity that
substantially affects interstate commerce. Second, CERCLA's text, structure, and legislative history reveal a clear
legislative intent to apply the response costs liability section
retroactively.
The Olin decision was a major departure from existing
case law. As a result, the Olin decision had the potential to
allow those who jeopardize the lives of humans and the environment to reap the benefits of their conduct without contributing to rectifying the affliction. Parties that have polluted
should not be able to benefit from their wrongdoing merely
because at the time there was no statute forbidding their heinous acts.

334. See id.
335. See generally id.
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